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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE RIDDLE OF THE PALSGRAF CASE
By

A

LTHOUGH

THOMAS

A. COWAN*

now ten years old and the much scarred object of

attack and counter-attack by learned writers in the field of
torts, the case of Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad' is still the best
springboard available from which to plunge into the troubled
waters of the law of negligence. The decision raises most of the
important issues of this branch of the law. In addition, it has the
advantage of being a real case decided by distinguished judges. A
hypothetical case involving the same facts would be regarded as too
fantastic for serious consideration.
If the Palsgraf Case were nothing but the record of the disposal of a lawsuit, then the unremitting attention which it has
received from writers on the law of torts would be difficult to
understand.2 However, it is more than a mere case. It is a legal
institution. Not only is it constantly cited with approval and followed by numerous courts; it is also a direct and distinct intellectual challenge to anyone who finds it necessary to read and to
understand it. In this article, the writer proposes to do two things:
First, and incidentally, to state as precisely as possible what he
believes the Palsgraf Case stands for. Second, and mainly, to discuss in general terms several important aspects of the law of
negligence in the light of that famous decision.3
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1(1928) 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99.
'See particularly Green, The Palsgraf Case, (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev.
789; Green, Judge and Jury (1930) Ch. 8; Goodhart, The Unforeseeable
Consequences of a Negligent Act, (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 449; Harper, Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause, (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1001,
1004; Harper, Treatise on the Law of Torts (1933) 154, 166; Buckland,
The Duty of Care, (1935) 51 L. Q. Rev. 637; Prosser, The Minnesota
Court on Proximate Cause, (1936) 21 MINNEsOrA LAW REVIEW 19, 31
et seq.; Restatement, Torts, sec. 281 (b), Comment g.
3The law of negligence, unlike many other branches of the common law,
owes much of its present form to the great writers on torts. Their ideas
pervade the entire subjict and one can write on negligence today only
within the intellectual milieu which they have created. The following discussion is no exception to the rule. On the contrary, it may be taken as a
particularly good example of the operation of this principle. It is clear,
therefore, that it would be impossible to credit by means of specific reference every writer whose ideas have beetf-made use of in this article. Never-
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At the risk of wearying those readers who have the case well
in mind, we must repeat its essential facts. The plaintiff Mrs.
Palsgraf. while awaiting a train, was standing under some scales
on a station platform of the defendant railroad. Thirty feet or
more away, railroad guards were assisting a passenger to board
a slowly moving train. The passenger was carrying an innocent
looking package which contained explosive fireworks; and when
this was knocked under the wheels of the coach by one of the railroad guards, it exploded. The platform was shaken, and the scales
were knocked down, injuring Mrs. Palsgraf. The jury found that
the guards had been negligent in handling the boarding passenger.
The trial court refused to charge that the negligent handling of
this passenger was not the proximate cause of the injury to Mrs.
Palsgraf. There was judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. In a three-to-two decision, the appellate division
4
affirmed the judgment.
The opinions of the judges of the appellate division are brief
and to the point. In the majority opinion, the judges agreed that
the jury might well find negligence. All other issues, except duty,
they resolved under the pat formula: "Every case must stand
upon its own facts." The duty breached was made out simply:
"Itmust be remembered that the plaintiff was a passenger of the
defendant, and entitled to have the defendant exercise the highest
degree of care required of common carriers."
The minority opinion was equally clear-cut. Although admitting
that the jury was warranted in finding the defendant negligent,
the dissenting judges argued that as a matter of law the injury was
too remote. They refused to regard the negligence of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury because of the intervening negligence "of the passenger in carrying explosives.
In the light of the concepts usually employed, either of these
thiss, I am conscious of being especially indebted to the following in addii,nto those cited in note 2 supra. Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts
(1926); Bohlen, Selected Essays on the Law of Torts (1924)
Green,
lK.tionale of Proximate Cause (1927) ; Green, The Duty Problem in Negli1-cnlcu Cases, (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 1014, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 255;
\\'infied, Duty in Tortious Negligence, (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 40; Winfield.
Th Lax. of Tort, (1935) 51 L. Q. Rev. 249; Pollock, Liability for Conse'Juclncs, (1922) 38 L. Q. Rev. 165; Pollock, The Law of Torts (13th ed.
1429), Edherton, Legal Cause, (1924) 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 211, 343; Mc1 -,uu'hlin, Proximate Cause, (1925) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 149; 1 Street, Founda,,f Legal L.iability (1906).
'Pal'grof v. I.g
Island R. R.. (1927) 222 App. Div. 166. 225 N. V.
S. 412.
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opinions would have disposed of the case quite satisfactorily. The
case is an ordinary one involving a freak accident. The books are
full of them, and usually they are settled by reference to duty of
care or to proximate cause.
However, the PalsgrafCase was not destined to rest at the level
of simplicity. In the court of appeals it became the subject of two
involved opinions, that of the court being written by Judge
Cardozo and that of the dissentients by Judge Andrews. The
judgments of the appellate division and of the trial court were
reversed and the complaint was dismissed. That much is certain.
But the reasons for the ruling of the court of appeals and the
reasons why the minority opposed that ruling are buried in a
tangled web of legal theories.
For the majority, Judge Cardozo wrote that the defendant's
servants, if negligent at all, had been negligent toward the passenger; that no duty of care was owed to Mrs. Palsgraf since no
risk of injury to her was foreseeable; that Mrs. Palsgraf might
not avail herself of the duty owed to someone else as the basis of
liability to her on some theory of negligence in the abstract; and
that since no duty was made out, there was nothing for the jury to
find respecting negligence, and no inquiry into proximate cause was
in order.
Judge Andrews' opinion for the minority took the view that
since the jury found the defendant negligent at least toward the
passenger, such negligent conduct entailed liability for all harmful
consequences of which it was the proximate cause. In his view,
one owes to the world at large a duty to refrain from conduct
creating an unreasonable risk of injury to others. If harm results
from such conduct, a breach of duty is fully made out. Whether
the negligence of the defendant was in fact the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury was in his opinion not a question which the
appellate court might properly consider.
Negligence toward the passenger, therefore, was a large bone
of contention in the court of appeals. Judge Cardozo's opinion
seems to center around what might be called "transferred negligence," on analogy to the similar doctrine of transferred intent.
He says repeatedly that although the conduct of the defendant's
guards might have been negligent as to the passenger, it was not
negligent as to Mrs. Palsgraf. Her right of action must be
primary, not derivative. It must stem from a duty owed to her,
not to someone else. The trial court and the appellate division had
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decided the case without reference to a possible right of action
in the passenger against the defendant. Could not the court of
appeals have done the same thing?
Let us take the passenger (and any duty owed to him) out of
the case for the moment. Suppose the defendant's servants were
negligent in loading a crate, owned by the defendant or another, on
the baggage car of a train. Unknown to anyone in the railroad's
employ, the crate unlawfully contained dynamite. The dynamite
exploded, the scales were thrown down and Mrs. Palsgraf was
injured. How would the case be decided now? Surely not on
the ground that a duty was owed to the owner of the crate and
that Mrs. Palsgraf might not derive from that duty a right of
action for herself. The hypothetical case would be decided, we
may presume, either on the theory of foreseeability or unreasonableness of risk (duty), or on proximate cause, or both. The
decision of the majority would then be that no duty owed to Mrs.
Palsg-raf had been breached since she was outside the area of
foreseeable risk. The minority's view would be that a duty owed
to the plaintiff had been breached, and that the appellate court
could not say as a matter of law that the negligence was not the
proximate cause of the injury. The duty of the railroad to the
owner of the crate would not be relevant.
Both Cardozo and Andrews needlessly complicated their
opinions by neglecting to dismiss from consideration the question
of duty owed to the passenger. With Cardozo this position seemed
to make it necessary for him to do battle with the theory of "negligence in the air," a theory which Andrews lost no time in repudiating. Second, Cardozo was forced to consider and discard
the theory of transferred negligence. Andrews, of course, relied
upon "transferred negligence." In fact, he carried transference
to its ultimate conclusion by raising the duty of care to the rank
of a universal command: "Everyone owes to the world at large
the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably
threaten the safety of others." By this process of expansion he
found a duty to the plaintiff.
It would have been much simpler if Cardozo could merely
have said that injury to the plaintiff was unforeseeable and that
hence she was outside the area of risk. Likewise Andrews could
simply have said that the defendant's conduct was negligent as to
Mrs. Palsgraf and that the refusal of the trial judge to rule that
the negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury was
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justified. This view would serve to dispose of the Palsgraf Case.
Of course, it would not also dispose of the legal problems raised
by the case: namely, transferred negligence, duty of care, foreseeability, and proximate cause.
TRANSFERRED NEGLIGENCE

A's conduct subjects B to unreasonable risk of injury. C is
hurt as a result of A's act. Has A violated a duty to C? On judge
Andrews' theory one might be inclined to answer that he had,
since every one owes to the world at large the duty not to threaten
unreasonably the safety of others. On judge Cardozo's theory,
one might reply that he bad not, unless C was within the orbit of
risk.
The difference between these tests of the existence of the duty
is not as 5vide as the verbal statement of them might seem to indicate. Cardozo says that the test is this: Did the-defendant owe
to Mrs. Palsgraf (or to one of her general class, i. e. intending
passengers) a duty not to subject her to a risk which had as a
foreseeable result the likelihood of the type of injury that occurred?
Andrews, on the other hand, says that the test is the following:
Did the defendant owe to the world at large the duty not to engage
in conduct unreasonably dangerous to others, regardless of whether
injury to Mrs. Palsgraf was foreseeable or not? Andrews did not
mean that, given a condition of negligence toward some one, the
defendant is liable for all injuries that actually occur to anyone
whatever. "Proximate cause" still limits liability. And Cardozo
did not mean that likelihood of injury to the individual plaintiff
had to be foreseeable. It would suffice if the risk was to a general
class of which the plaintiff was a member. Cardozo might deny
liability by holding that the plaintiff's injury fell outside the foreseeable orbit of risk; Andrews could reach the same result by
calling the injury remote, or the risk not unreasonable. In other
words, if the judges had used different tests of the existence of
duty, the same results could have been reached. Conversely, if
the judges had used the same tests, different results could have
been arrived at. In the Palsgraf Case, the intuition of the two
judges led them to different results, but this was not necessarily
because they used different methods.
Now, although identical results might be reached under either
theory, this does not mean that the temper of the doctrines is the
same. Unquestionably, Judge Andrews imposes a stricter standard
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of responsibility, and the application of his rule would be likely
to result in more judgments for plaintiffs. He does not excuse
unforeseeable harm. His only limitation is proximate cause,
whereas Cardozo allows both to limit liability.
As Cardozo pointed out, Andrews' theory of duty is analogous
to the doctrine of "transferred intent." It conceives of negligence
as continuing anti-social conduct. A, intending to injure B, accidently injures C. A is held liable on the basis of an intentional
injury to C. I have not heard anyone explain transferred intent
on the theory that one owes to the world at large the duty not to
subject the safety of others to risk of intentional harm and that
one who intends harm to another intends harm to all others. And
yet this might do as hasty rationalization of the cases on intended
wrongs. Cardozo admits that his theory does not apply to wilful
wrongs, which he implies are governed by the less refined rule of
the earlier law that one acts at his peril. He makes no attempt
to explain why the rule of intentional wrong should be different
from that for injuries arising from negligence. The intimation is
that when the law becomes less barbaric, the rule of intentional
wrongs will change to conform to that of negligence. However,
we are far from sure of that. Liability without specific fault is
growing, not diminishing.
Let us scrutinize more closely the analogy between transferred
intent and transferred negligence. A, intending to harm B, injures C, an innocent bystander. A is held to have "intended" the
injury to C. Can the injury to C really be called intentional, or
must we say that though the injury to C was not intentional, nevertheless one bent on mischief is liable for all the harm he causes?
Either theory will do. We may regard the injury as intentional, by expanding the meaning of the term intentional. That
is, we may depersonalize the end terminus of the relation "intends
to injure," so that the proposition, A intends to injure B, implies
that A intends to injure everybody. Intent is thus transferred
from one to all. On the contrary, we may refuse to regard the
injury to C as intentional, but hold A responsible on the theory of
absolute liability for all harm caused where intention to injure
anyone is made out. This position rejects the possibility that intent can be transferred and thus is in accord with the popular
notion that intent is a specific state of mind, but the result is the
same.
There is indeed a third alternative which regards transference

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

as neither right nor wrong, but irrelevant. It might be called
objective intent. Working backward from the injury to the act of
the defendant, it determines whether in fact the defendant's
conduct entailed that high degree of likelihood of harm which one
customarily associates with intention to injure. This theory disregards the defendant's secret intention or state of mind and
gathers intent solely from conduct. It also dismisses as irrelevant
defendant's desire to injure some specific individual or thing, and
takes account only of the probability of harm attendant upon his
risky conduct.
These three theories may also be applied to "transferred negligence." If this is done the third (the objective theory) which is
weakest for intent, becomes strongest for negligence. Let us suppose that A's conduct is such that if injury were to result to B,
A would be negligent toward B. In fact C is injured. Here again
we may expand the meaning of negligence (or duty of care) by
depersonalizing the object end of the relation "is negligent
to." Negligence to one becomes negligence to all. Second, we
may refuse to expand the term negligence, but impose absolute
liability once a condition of negligence (less injury) to anyone is
found. Finally, we may merely regard defendant's conduct objectively, and ask whether in fact it constituted an unreasonable
risk to the injured party without regard to whatever other persons or objects might likewise have been subjected to risk of injury. This third view rejects negligent states of mind, negligence
in the abstract and negligence in the air. It avoids the sense of
unreality attached to Andrews' doctrine of negligence toward the
whole world. Moreover, this view escapes the danger that the
risk to the person actually injured will be minimized whenever the
risk to the one who escaped injury is much greater.5 For instance,
it is just possible that if the railroad guards had been careless in
loading a box on the train rather than in assisting a passenger
(and hence a depositary of legal rights in himself), the court
might have been more willing to agree that the defendant was
negligent as to Mrs. Palsgraf.
Whatever may be said of the desirability of retaining the no5
Throughout the entire opinion Cardozo had his eye focused on the
boarding passenger. Injury to him was more likely than injury to Mrs.
Palsgraf. This is a psychological weakness in the foreseeability test. It is
difficult to regard as foreseeable an unlikely injury, when an injury much
more likely to happen does not in fact occur. In determining foreseeability,
risk alone is relevant. What injury actually happened is not in point. And
the greater risk tends to overshadow and minimize the lesser risk.
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tion of transferred intent, transferred negligence should be discarded out of hand. The doctrine is not needed. It is commonplace that carelessness leads to unexpected injuries. In determining whether the careless agent is liable for injury which, though
less likely, has in fact occurred, it is in no sense important to
consider what other possible injuries were more probable.
Andrews' doctrine of transferred negligence is in result a
species of strict liability, with the qualification that the defendant's
conduct be virtually negligent, i.e., have all the elements of negligence toward someone, save only damage to that one. It is an intermediate position between liability for all harm however caused,
and liability only to the restricted class foreseeably subjected to
unreasonable risk.
Andrews' theory runs counter to what I believe is still current
sentiment in favor of dangerous enterprise." Even reckless conduct, certainly mere negligence, and particularly risk in commercial
enterprise, when not resulting in actual damage are all apt to be
lightly regarded and readily condoned. In a vast number of cases,
liability for negligence is in no sense based upon carelessness or
inadvertence, but is the foreseeable result of the pursuit of the
ordinary affairs of life in an exemplary manner. This is the basis
of workmen's compensation statutes and is generally recognized
as such. What is not so frequently mentioned is the fact that all
human endeavor takes its expectable toll of invaded interests. Industry maims and kills others than its employees with fairly determinable regularity. Automobilists slay those rash enough to
venture upon the public highways with a periodic frequency that
is a delight to students of actuarial science. One does not know
of the manifold and complicated legislative and judicial standards
of care. One cares even less, until the possibility of damage enters
the picture. Enterprise would stop or liability insurance would
be universal if standards of care had always to be observed. This
is the real basis of the popular objection to strict liability, and not
the moral sentiment that liability should be based on fault.
DUTY OF CARE

Both judges require the breach of a duty of care as an element
of liability for negligence. They differ in the way they determine
the existence of the duty. Cardozo's duty is based on foreseeability. Andrews' is not. Yet, each test bespeaks duty.
6See Green, judge and Jury (1930), 65-74 and authorities there cited.
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There has been much discussion of the place of duty in the
Anglo-American law of negligence. Professor Winfield traces its
origin and development in the cases.7 He finds it is late come
to English law. He does not approve of it, but he concludes that
it is so firmly imbedded in the law that great confusion and much
inconvenience would result from uprooting it.8 Professor Buckland is not so timorous." He suggests that the concept should
be altogether dispensed with.
How much did the concept of duty contribute to the solution
of the Palsgraf Case? Nothing at all, so far as I can see. Certainly
no one will say that Andrews' attenuation of duty to cover the
"world at large" leaves any effectiveness in the notion of duty-as
an instrument of specific analysis. One owes a duty to the world
at large not to be negligent, just as one owes a duty to the world
at large to do or to refrain from doing many things. Judge Andrews' statement of duty merely means that conduct entailing
unreasonable risk of injury may be actionable.
Does Cardozo's idea of duty aid analysis? I believe not. He
also uses the term to mean that conduct entailing unreasonable risk
of injury may be actionable, but he adds the proviso that the action
may be maintained only by those to whom injury was foreseeable.
He too could ignore the concept duty, by simply stating his rule
in terms of unreasonable and foreseeable risk.
The law lays upon everyone a duty not to injure others in actionable ways. This is merely a definition in a circle, and has all
the truth and all the sterility of every tautologous proposition.
Duty is an empty concept, for law, until filled up with meaning
by statute or decision. To say that a duty exists is a short way of
saying that liability may be imposed. To say that a duty does not
exist is a short way of deciding the case adversely to the plaintiff.
In each instance duty adds nothing to the definition of the tort
sued upon. It is a symbol or shorthand device to sum up a class
of actionable wrongs.
This does not mean that the concept duty has no important
work to do. On the contrary, its ovident purpose is to permit the
judge to take the question out of the hands of the jury. Or, to
put the matter more generally, it enables the court to substitute a
question of law for a question of fact. By this device appellate
courts permit themselves to enter more particularly into the fact
7

Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 41.
Duty in Tortious Negligence, (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 41, 58.
sWinfield,
9
Buckland, The Duty of Care, (1935) 51 L. Q. Rev. 637, 643 et seq.
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determinations of negligence cases. The more willingness that is
shown on the part of courts, especially appellate courts, to consider the existence of duty, the less is the chance that there will be
anything left for the finders of fact to do. As a practical matter,
whether duty is found or not, the habit of looking for it is always
a potential limitation on liability.
Unfortunately, when the court passes on the question of duty
and either finds or refuses to find a duty, it is required to formulate a rule of law, and a rule of law is presumed to possess general applicability. Hence, courts willing and anxious to define
duties are under the necessity of generalizing all kinds of fact
situations. The result often is a rule of law not reflecting any substantial social conviction. On the contrary, a finding of fact in
a tort case is less open to such defect. Its social significance
seldom goes beyond the interest of the parties to the suit. Moreover, it creates no precedent, leaves little room for learned dispute
and does not trouble to justify itself by appealing to general principles. A rule of law, on the other hand, is precedential and disp utable. It always embodies what purport to be general principles.
And in the vast majority of negligence cases these characteristics
of the rule of law prove to be quite embarrassing. The Palsgraf
Case, for example, has just those aspects of uniqueness, chance
and impalpability which had best be buried and forgotten in the
verdict of a jury rather than be perpetuated in a rule of law. It
expresses nothing significant of social policy. No general agreement. I venture to think, can be had as to whether the result of the
decision is "good" or "bad."
What is the legitimate function of the court in defining duties
in negligence cases? A duty of care is a rule of law which sums
up in general terms the significant phases of an entire class of
factual situations entailing unreasonable risk of injury. Dutyiwaking is an aspect of the universal effort to introduce into the
law the economizing effect of subsuming specific instances under
peneral rules. It mail be asserted with confidence that the urge to
,-cneralize is nothing less than a biological necessity. Hence in law
ni less than in life the activity of generalization goes on unabated.
To substitute one rule for a potentially unlimited number of
specific cases is not merely good legal theory and practice. It is a
condition requisite to the survival of legal institutions. Therefore
the function of the judge in enunciating rules of duty is as necessary as it is proper. It might be added that the function is not
C-:erci-,:d properly unless its exercise be necessary.
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Thus there are two requirements of a sound legal rule. One is
the requirement that the rule should state a socially proper or desirable result. This needs no comment here. The second is that
the rule should refer to a set of facts having appreciable social
significance either because the factual situation recurs constantly.
or because the situation, though rare, is peculiarly the object of
deep social concern. If either of the above requirements is absent
the rule should not be made.
We might call the first of these conditions of a legal rule its
desirabilit, and the second its necessity. These terms have the
advantage of illustrating at once the distinction between the two
conditions and their interdependence. The distinction between
them is apparent. Their dependence may be said to be this: an
unnecessary rule of law cannot be regarded as the statement of a
desirable result; desirability of result alone may be regarded as
the necessity for stating the rule.
The principles here set forth may be illustrated by reference
to Cardozo's conception of duty in the Palsgraf Case. He spoke
of the duty of the railroad with respect to exposing an intending
passenger to foreseeable risk of harm. Specifically the rule that
he had in mind, if fully explicated, must be that a railroad does
not owe to an intending passenger the duty to refrain from permitting its guards to push upon a moving train another passenger
carrying a package which, though innocent in appearance, contains fireworks, and which, if joggled from the boarding passenger's arm, will fall to the tracks, explode, shake the platform,
knock down the scales, and thus injure the intending passenger.
Can anyone use fewer elements in stating this rule of dutyl'-a
rule which purports to be a rule of law?
When one considers the uniqueness of the rule of duty of the
10
t is true that some of the factual elements of the rule could be generalized. For example, for guards, read employees; for fireworks, read explosive substances; for shake the platform, read disturb the premises upon
which plaintiff rightfully stands, sits, lies; for scales, read adventitious
appurtenance; and so on. But this would not be a general rule of law even
though general terms were used in framing it. It still adds up to no more
than the Palsgraf Case. Generally speaking, the more elements a rule of law
contains, the fewer the cases to which it can be applied. And a rule of law
containing as many elements as that of the Palsgraf Case is very likely to
be applicable only to a Palsgraf situation. The larger the number of general characteristics ascribed to a class, the greater the likelihood that the
class will contain only one member. Like the game the children play: Is
"it" animal, vegetable or mineral? Male or female? American or foreign?
This is the basis of the Bertillon method of identifying criminals. Philosophically, the process is akin to Leibnitz's principium identitatis indiscernibilium (identfication by minute description).
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Palsgraf Case, it seems inescapable that there was no necessity
for stating it at all. Was the result socially desirable?Who knows?
And this shows the connection between necessity and desirability.
Society at large could not possibly have an opinion, one way or
the other, on such a complicated issue. A socially desirable result
must represent a consensus of opinion, or at least the judge should
think that it does. Experience will test his perspicacity. But if
the situation is a freak, there is no opportunity to weigh opinion,
real or potential.
Cardozo's view of the nature of duty 1 made him willing to
regard the duty toward the plaintiff's bodily security as possibly
quite different from the duty with respect to security of the plaintiff's property. Professor Goodhart wonders whether one accepting this view would be willing to differentiate between duty respecting the plaintiff's foot and his eye, between his ship and the
cargo which it carries."- Why not? In enumerating the elements
of the alleged duty of the railroad to Mrs. Palsgraf, it would add
little to the rule to distinguish between injury to her eye (less
to be foreseen if the scales were only three feet high) and injury
to her foot (more to be foreseen in such circumstances). The rule
,f duty in the Palsgraf Case already encompasses the bounds of
the absurd. Therefore reductio ad absurdum is a work of superIany socially significant rules of law may be and are
crogation.
founded on the distinction between bodily security and security of
property. To this extent, Professoi Goodhart's criticism seems
to lack cogency. But when one considers that the distinction between body and property may be superimposed upon the already
distressingly artificial rule of the Palsgraf Case, the criticism becomes quite pointed.
Rules of law which distinguish occupiers' duties to trespassers
from those to tolerated intruders or to invitees are examples of
"Cardozo's theory of duty has been called relational. Duty is regarded

as a relation between the defendant and a possible set of plaintiffs, or more
specifically a relation between the defendant and some, but not all, particular
interests of particular possible plaintiffs. There is a verbal inaccuracy, I
think, in the use of the expression, "relational." The term "relative" I believe
is intended. Andrews' duty is absolute; that of Cardozo is relative to particular interests of particular plaintiffs likely to be harmed as the result of
particular risks. It is true that Cardozo speaks of negligence "with relation
to" certain plaintiffs. However, this is an accident of language. He might
have spoken of negligence "toward" certain persons. If he had, no one would
have been tempted to call his view of duty "towardal." It might be better to
call Andrews' view of duty general and that of Cardozo specific. At any
rate, Cardozo is willing to differentiate duties on chance matters of fact.
12Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, (1930)
39 Yale L. J. 449, 467.
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significantly differentiated rules. They are addressed to situations
respecting which social policy differs. Moreover, they save litigation because they generalize a large number of likely fact situations.
A statute, too, may well impose a duty on a particular class of
persons to avoid special risks to designated persons or things. Here
again, the classification upon which the general rule is based is
likely to be socially significant. But when courts take freak situations from juries on the ground of duty, the resulting rule of law
is apt to be a sport.
To sum up the question of duty: Duty is not an element of
negligence but a device to permit the court to take cases from the
triers of fact. Duty is always stated as a rule of law in order to
relieve this invasion of its seeming arbitrary character. It goes
without saying that the result stated by the rule of duty should be
socially desirable. No less important, perhaps, as a hallmark of
formal competence, the rule should possess general applicability.
Otherwise, the economizing effect of generalization will have been
achieved at too great a price, and the individual instance will be
elevated to the dignity of a general rule. The least disastrous
effect of such procedure is that the rule so stated demands more
attention than it deserves or would get as an individual instance.
At its worst, this habit has a stultifying effect on the judicial
process. It brings the whole task of legal rule-making into disrepute
and induces in reaction an unhealthy specificism, an overweening
tendency to regard every case as sui juris.
The writer is inclined to believe that courts should hesitate to
interfere with the triers of fact in negligence cases. Our courts
would go a long way toward establishing the law of negligence on a
more rational basis if interference with negligence verdicts were restricted to clearly discerned questions of public policy. An alternative would be to refrain from reporting such cases. But little
hope exists on this score, since the commercial interests of the
reporting agencies are too firmly entrenched, and since (in most
jurisdictions) the assumption may presumably be made that when
the appellate court takes a negligence case, an issue of law is involved.
The duty mania grows, and the law of negligence grows with
it but not in wisdom nor in grace. One faced with the necessity
of introducing order into the decisions is overwhelmed by the
conviction that he is in the presence of the designedly perverse.
Such chaos could not be accidental.
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FORESEEABILITY

Duty is not a constituent element of a tort. Whether a duty
exists in a given case is thus not a question of the external nature
of the defendant's act. It is rather a matter of the internal organization of the judicial process. Foreseeability is quite different.
It is an element of defendant's external legal behavior. It is based
upon a profoundly important social policy. That is, whether
liability for negligence should be restricted to harms resulting from
conduct foreseeably dangerous is a matter in which everyone has a
stake. Contrasted with this, the various duties which various
courts impose on sundry defendants are judicial ephemerae. Only
a very few of them indeed have lasting significance.
Foreseeability was the basis of the majority opinion in the
Palsgraf Case. What can be said for it? Is it more subjective
than Andrews' theory of general negligence? Which theory more
ncarly accords with current mores?
We must admit with Professor Harper that neither of these
theories coerces decision.13 Cases may be decided either way with
either theory. But this does not mean that they are mere rationalizations to be used or discarded at will. There is a toughness, an
unyielding quality to them. A court which chooses one theory
rather than another is apt to be stuck with it. Although first choice
may be made for conscious fitting of theory to ends, yet once
chosen the theory takes on vigorous life of its own and may even
dictate the decision of subsequent cases in the hands of all but
the strongest judges. A theory may be a horse to take you where
you want to go, but if you mount a horse you cannot get him to
climb a tree for you. One who chooses Cardozo's foreseeability
theory is bound to have trouble with unforeseeable harm that should
not go uncompensated.
Why should foreseeability of risk be thought of as a necessary element in negligence? Foreseeability has a strong moral
conn,,tation. To persist in conduct whose foreseeable result is
risk of injury to another's safety borders on the morally reprehensible. It may be justified, but it needs justification. What has
this to do with the law of negligence? The following explanation
might serve as a partial answer.
A fundamental contradiction in the law of torts is this: for
the most part the law in action looks upon tort liability as punishV"Harper, Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause, (1932)
Mich. L. Rev. 1001, 1002-4.
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ment for wrongdoing, whereas the plaintiff is interested only in
having his own personal damage repaired. The courts really tend
to administer the law of torts as a branch of criminal law; the
plaintiff would like to regard the issue as strictly civil. Those injured in person or property who sue for damage would prefer not
to have the moral delinquency of the defendant the criterion of
responsibility. If the harm is the result of the conscious act of the
defendant, it is hard for the plaintiff to see that he can recover only
when the defendant is at fault. The damage is the same in any
event. As between two innocent parties, why should the one who
suffers injury sustain the whole loss?
Our legal procedure is thought not to be capable of apportioning loss among innocent participants of an injury. In the usual
common law case some one must win and some one must lose.
Similarly we feel that it is impolitic to apportion loss among
wrongdoers, whether plaintiffs or defendants, perhaps because this
seems to be trafficking with evil.
We may expect that the distant future will regard these selfimposed limitations with the puzzlement that- we now feel when
we consider how our ancient courts were tied down with the
forms of action. Our legal historians tell us that once upon a time
justice did not exist for those whose disputes did not fit a form of
action. Is the result not precisely the same today? Comparative
negligence in its broadest sense, and adjustment of loss among
innocent participants of an injury, do not fit our judicial forms.
These things are supposed to be too subtle for court and jury
which, quite inconsistently, are thought capable of determining
the amount necessary to assuage the pangs of a broken heart, or
to make financially whole one who has suffered the loss of a limb.
Most intentional wrongdoing of a serious nature, and certain
types of negligent conduct, whether resulting in injury or not, are
and should be punishable criminally. And here the fault of the
agent may well be the basis of legal inquiry. But when the injured party seeks to have his damage repaired, fault should be
irrelevant. To be sure, the law may limit its protection to injuries
resulting from fault. However, such limitation is capricious. Besides, it requires a complicated investigation into the tangled
ethical and psychological problem of fault.
It is too much to expect the law of torts to abandon moral inquiry outright. Fault as the basis of tort liability is deeply
imbedded in the law. Yet there is a decided movement away from
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this limitation." Legislation particularly discards fault as the
criterion for fixing responsibility for loss. 1" Statutes defining
standards of care seldom excuse those free from fault."0 That the
defendant is not at fault is just as small a comfort to the average
plaintiff as is the employer's lack of fault to an injured workman,
to take but one example. Both plaintiffs want compensation.
Suppose that court and jury were deemed capable of apportioning responsibility among all the factors that contribute to an injury. Would it not be possible to decide roughly how much the
railroad contributed to Mrs. Palsgraf's injury, and how much
the passenger was responsible? Certainly, the railroad contributed
something to the injury, though not all. Would it not be better
to try to ascertain what proportion this was rather than to give
her nothing as the majority did, or to give her everything at the
hands of one defendant as Judge Andrews would have done?'7
PROXIMATE CAUSE

There are two types of causes that are regarded as not proximate. One is a cause that is an element of a component of causes
only some of which are attributable to the defendant. The other
is a cause far removed conceptually from the harm done. The first
situation is usually referred to as concurrent, intervening, or
superseding cause. The second is generally called a remote as
distinguished from a proximate cause.

The two are capable of

being regarded as quite different in legal effect.
INTERVENING CAUSE

If plaintiff's act concurs with another cause to effect an injury,
our law usually requires that full responsibility for the injury be
I1Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts (1926) 439. The English appear
to have gone farther in this direction than we. "At the outset it is worth
noting that the punitive or moral element seems stronger in American law
than it is in the English." Goodhart, The Restatement of the Law of Torts,
(1935) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 411, 416.
i5Workmen's
compensation acts are obvious examples.
'0 The technique of the courts in holding that a violation of a statutory
duty of care is negligence per se is in effect a recognition that fault in these
cases is irrelevant.
17This is of course the mere statement of an ideal. I do not mean to
indicate that distribution of loss among the various factors which cause the
injury is simple. On the contrary, equitable distribution of loss is an extremely complex matter, even though the ideal of distribution is easily to be
apprehended. In this connection see Prosser, Joint Torts and Several
Liability, (1937) 35 Cal. L. Rev. 413; Gregory, Loss Distribution by Comparative Negligence, (1936) 21
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statutory solution of this problem see Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution
in Negligence Actions (1935).
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attributed to one cause. If the concurrent cause is the negligent
conduct of another we may have joint tortfeasors, with each fully
responsible as a rule. If the concurrent cause is the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff, he must ordinarily accept full responsibility for the injury. If the concurrent cause is not contributory
negligence, but is of such a nature as to relieve defendant of responsibility, we have intervening or superseding cause.
For those who believe that liability should be restricted to
foreseeable harms, foreseeability is as relevant to intervening cause
as it is to a determination of duty of care. In fact, intervening
cause may be subsumed under the concept of duty of care. Duty
of care is a matter of foreseeable risk. Risk may be regarded as
determinable by the likely consequences of defendant's act, and the
likely consequences of defendant's act are closely related to the
likely consequences of any alleged intervening cause. The whole
thing might well be cast in the form of a preliminary determination of the existence of duty.
Naturally, when intervening cause is pleaded and the foreseeability test is resorted to, the matter becomes quite complicated.'Assuming that each of the legal causes was a condition sine qua
non, we then might have to ask ourselves the following questions:
a. Was the foreseeable risk attending plaintiff's act unreasonable even though no other cause should intervene?'O
b. Was the foreseeable risk that another cause should intervene
unreasonable ?20

c. Even though the risk that the intervening cause should
occur was slight, was the foreseeable risk of injury to the defendant
from the occurrence of the intervening cause so great that the
plaintiff should have been deterred from acting?21
'SProsser,

The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, (1936) 21
Rs.viEW 19, 38 et seq.
1 Negligence with respect to the following entails a high degree of risk,
and even though an intervening cause be necessary in the particular case,
this requirement may be a triviality compared with the danger of defendant's
original conduct: Explosives, high-power tension lines, escaping gas.
unlabelled poison, runaway animals and vehicles, unsafely braked trulles
and 20
locomotives, negligently started fires, and the like.
The following may be cited as examples of causes highly likely to
intervene: change of weather, rescue of persons and property, dangerous
conditions attractive to children, negligence, carelessness, inadvertence, or
mere inaction of third parties, etc. See Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as
Superseding Cause, (1937) 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121.
21
The risk attending the intervening cause may be the same as tlhose
cited in note 18 supra with respect to defendant's own act. In addition, the
criminal acts of third persons offer a high degree of risk of injury even
thouch there be little likelihood that such criminal acts will in fact intervene,
MINNESOTA LAW
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d. To sum up the above: Was the component foreseeable risk
of plaintiff's act and the intervening cause unreasonable?
To illustrate (a) : X negligently loads dynamite on a truck.
When crossing the only trolley track in town, the truck strikes the
only obstruction of its size on the trolley line; a box of canned
dynamite is dislodged, falling to the track; a one-man trolley approaches; the conductor-motorman is inside collecting fares; the
box is struck by the trolley, does not explode, but its contents are
strewn over a part of the track where small children are unlawfull), playing, etc., etc. The number of intervening causes and
their extreme unlikeness are quite irrelevant. Risk of injury was
the foreseeable result of the negligent loading of the dynamite.
This risk was so great that it may be regarded as foreseeable
(unreasonably probable) even though the injury results from the
miost unusual concatenation of events. This is close, of course, to
intentional injury, that is, to the limiting condition of the foreseeability test, the point where probability of injury is legally
regarded as 1.000.
To illustrate (b): X negligently leaves unlocked at noon the
door of a warehouse containing barrels of flour, although it is well
known that a gang of mischievous boys in the neighborhood make
the warehouse their rendezvous whenever opportunity affords. The
boys enter and roll a barrel of flour down an inclined loading platform injuring a chance passerby on the otherwise usually deserted
street back of the warehouse. We can say here that although the
risk of defendant's action (to the plaintiff) was not high in itself,
and although the danger of the intervening cause when and if it
should occur was not very great, yet the probability that the dangerous cause would intervene was unreasonably strong, and hence the
risk to the plaintiff might be foreseeable.
To illustrate (c) : An automobile repairman tightens the brakes
of a truck for a dynamite factory so negligently that the brakes
will hold only if the truck is driven slowly and carefully but not
if it should exceed, say, the legal speed limit. It is highly unlikely
that a dynamite truck will be driven too fast. Yet we may say
that risk of injury to third persons is foreseeable because of the
great likelihood of danger if and when the intervening cause begins
2
to operate. This rule explains the case of Hines v. Garrett=
where the conductor of a railroad forced a young woman to disembark from the train in a region in which dangerous characters
L"-2(1921) 131 Va. 125, 108 S. E. 690.
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might be lurking. The woman was raped and the railroad was
held liable. The risk of rape was slight, but a slight risk of rape
is sufficient.
When we call the above types of injury foreseeable we are
giving the term foreseeable a meaning that is strictly entre nous.
Foreseeability is an unfortunate word. It seems to be linked unshakeably to the physical act of seeing. In fact, of course, foreseeability, as the "fore" indicates, is not "seeability" at all. Rather
it is a question of the extent to which forethought might have induced or forestalled action. The probability of harm to the defendant is the criterion. And when intervening cause is in question, the probability that the cause will in fact intervene, and the
probability of harm to the defendant when and if the extraneous
cause does intervene all are factors of the component probability.
Hence, the chain of sequences may be fantastically linked, and still
there may exist probability of harm to the plaintiff so great as to
be unreasonable because of the fact that defendant's act, though
not risky in itself, is very likely to give occasion to the intervention of a harmful cause, or, what is more apt to be the case, because the intervening cause, though quite unlikely to occur, will
result in very serious injury if in fact it does occur.
Probability of harm is a component of likelihood of injury and
seriousness of injury. Speaking loosely, we may say that a great
degree of likelihood of some danger is equal to some likelihood
of great danger. Hence even if plaintiff's act requires another
cause in order to produce harm, and even if the probability that the
other cause will intervene is slight, yet where the resulting danger
from the intervening cause is great, there may be appreciable probability of injury to the defendant, and, therefore, foreseeability.
Our law of intervening cause is burdened with a singleness of
purpose that has already been adverted to. We insist upon looking
for one efficient cause of the injury. It would be much better if
here again we could marshal every effective cause, and divide responsibility among them.23 If the defendant's negligence combines
with that of another, apportion the effect of each and divide responsibility. If the defendant's negligence combines with an act
of God and with the contributory negligence of the plaintiff to
cause the injury, distribute responsibility among all parties concerned.24
I shall not undertake to examine the difficulty of dividing up
23
See supra note 16.
24

"When, in addition to the fault of the defendant, another of the diverse
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the causes of a given effect. However, if judge and jury can
determine proximate cause, a metaphysical inquiry at best, they
should likewise be equipped to decide what part each cause plays
in the attainment of the result.
REMOTE CAUSE

So far in this section, we have been speaking mostly of
intervening cause. Remote cause is something else. In intervening cause, the question is whether the injury is legally attributable to the defendant's act. Remoteness of cause is concerned with the extent to which defendant can be held responsible
for damage resulting from an act otherwise legally attributable to
him. It is admitted that defendant's act "caused" the injury. The
question here is whether he should nonetheless be excused from
repairing any or all of the damage he has done. With certain exceptions, the arbitrary rule seems to be that if the defendant is
responsible for any injury resulting from his act, he is responsible

for all injury so resulting.
This is a form of strict liability once legal damage, however

slight, is made out. Here again the extent of the damage could
be governed by the foreseeability rule. The probable extent of
injury is just as determinable as the probability of injury, and if
probability of harm determines liability, then probable extent of
harm should determine extent of liability.
The exemptions from liability because of remoteness of cause
are apt to be arbitrary. Even though no intervening cause break
the chain, the courts sometimes call an abrupt halt to liability for
extended damages. This is a form of discharge in bankruptcy
without assignment of assets for the benefit of creditors. The
New York rule of liability for spreading fires is an example. New
York gives nothing to any but adjacent owners. "5 On the contrary,
in a similar situation, an English court gave the plaintiff everything in the Polemis Case. ' O Both rules are so crude as to offend
one's sense of justice.
antecedents of the injury is likewise regarded as causal, an apportionment
should be made as follows:
1. If the injury is the result partly of the fault of the defendant and
partly of vis major the defendant responds only for a part of the damage.
2. If at the same time it is the result of the fault of a third party, there
issolidary responsibility, whenever the effect of the fault of one of the agents
k.not clearly limited to a part of the damage.
3. In the event of fault of the victim, regarded as a concurrent cause
of the damage, responsibility must be apportioned by the "judge of the fact"
who has absolute discretion in estimating the share of the responsibility of
each."25 6 Planiol et Ripert, Droit Civil Franiais (1930) 743-744.
Ryan v. New York Cent. R. R., (1866) 35 N. Y. 210.
-GIn re Polemis & Furness. Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K. B. 560.
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CONCLUSION

A tort looks very like a crime. Then again it greatly resembles
a contract. Still, it is neither. Though differentiated, it has not
yet been individuated. The difficulty is brought in focus when
one deals with a tort arising from a contract, or with a tort that
is also a crime.
Not until 1914 did the English courts make up their minds
about what to do with a tort that was also a crime. 27 The doctrine
of merger used to be employed. Tort sank into crime much as
manslaughter is lost in murder. Now it is not thought necessary
to regard the interests of the plaintiff as insignificant when the
sovereign interests of the state are flouted by crime. The injured
party is no longer deemed to be sufficiently compensated with the
knowledge that the wrongdoer is being punished.
Tort should be distinguished from crime in the light of purpose.
The end of an action in tort is restitution, not punishment. Of
course, if restitution also hurts a wrongdoer, perhaps so much the
better, although this is a barbaric ethical principle. In a legal
system based essentially on money judgment, sanction is efficacious
only against those poor enough to feel the pinch of the judgment,
and rich enough to pay it.
We know what trouble the courts experience when asked to
separate a tort from the contract out of which it arises. Even yet
courts speak of privity being necessary. And we must not forget
that MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 28 was regarded generally as

a daring move. Tort is different from contract. The basis of
contractual relationships is planned undertaking. In unintentional
torts, the harmful result is unsought. What has happened is an
event which both parties deprecate. Can it be said that this has
anything in common with an event toward the attainment of which
both parties are deemed to have pledged themselves? To be sure,
contractual enterprises often go awry. The results are injuries
rather than benefits. True tort situations develop and the contract is relevant. But liability should not be governed by the rules
developed to care for contractual enterprises. Continental jurisprudence to the contrary notwithstanding, the basis of tort liability
should not be the will, however well that concept may serve as a
support for the law of contract.
The development of torts in Anglo-American law has been
27Smith v. Selwyn, [1914] 3 K. B. 98. See Winfield, The Law of Tort,
(1935) 51 L. Q. Rev. 249. 253.
28(1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050.
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warped by the vagaries of procedure. Assumpsit has twisted both
debt and trespass unnaturally. A promise to pay a debt, like a
promise to pay for a tort, has no meaning unless one is thinking
of a fresh acknowledgment of an existing obligation. Suppose
one does not promise to pay a debt or to make restitution for an
injury? Is the obligation less binding? However, this drum has
been beaten often enough. The literature on the subject is immense.
Subtract intentional undertakings (contract or tort) from the
body of the law 6f torts, leaving negligent and accidental injuries.
Define negligence, if you can, without reference to fault. Make it
the breach of an objective standard of care set by jury, court or
legislature. Bring together every substantial factor, human, natural and divine, which can be regarded as a cause sine qua non
of the injury, and apportion responsibility according to fault if
you must, or according to degree of participation, if you may.
This leaves only the question of remoteness of cause and effect.
Here again apportion loss ex aequo et bono. More for near causes,
less for ones far removed. Less for catastrophe of which defendant's act was merely the spark, more for damage resulting largely
from defendant's enterprise. And in any event, return much of
the law of negligence where it belongs: to the triers of fact, whose
decisions can be quickly forgotten. Appellate courts would thus
curb their dangerous penchant for crystallizing freak factual
situations into rules of law. I now move that we bury the Palsgra.
Case.

